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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are fascinated with sports. Every week thousands of fans
cram into stadiums while millions more stay glued to their television sets to
watch athletes battle on the field of competition. Television and other forms of
mass communication grant fans unprecedented access to athletes.' This massive
exposure coupled with a high demand for in-depth news reporting has fostered a
trend in sports journalism that focuses on every aspect of athletes' lives.2 In the
I Andrew K. Craige, The Rise in Press Criticism of the Athlete and the Future of Libel Litiga-
tion Involving Athletes and the Press, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 527 (1994).
2 Id. at 527.
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past, the press limited its commentary to athletes' performances on the field.3 In
those days, the press shielded athletes from public comment unrelated to athlet-
ics. 4 Today, statistics, injuries, and trades are still a central focus of sports re-
porting, but at times, the sports page takes on an almost tabloid appearance. An
athlete's professional and personal escapades are now fair game for analysis and
criticism from the press.
6
Supporting this trend in journalism is a legal doctrine that protects the
press from libel suits when reporting on athletes. Constitutional safeguards re-
quire public figures to prove with clear and convincing evidence that false de-
famatory communications were published maliciously to recover for libel.7 The
public or private status of a defamation plaintiff, therefore, is often the primary
focus of libel litigation, and is a significant hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.8
Accordingly, public figures rarely sue for defamation because the chances of
recovery are slight.9 Courts will almost always find professional and college
athletes to be public figures.'0 As a result, the sports media enjoys a near im-
munity from libel suits because pro and college athletes rarely sue for defama-
tion. l
A more difficult question is whether or not publications concerning high
school athletes are similarly protected. High school coaches have pressed libel
suits,' 2 but defamation law concerning high school athletes is largely undevel-
oped. As a practical matter, the public or private status of a high school athlete
is a rare question for courts. However, television's increased interest in amateur
sports combined with a changing atmosphere of high school athletics may lead
3 Id.
4 A knowing press once reported that Babe Ruth's absence from baseball was due to a belly
ache. In reality, Ruth was suffering from venereal disease. Id. at 527 n. 2.
5 An obvious example of this phenomenon is press coverage of the Kobe Bryant sexual as-
sault trial. In 2003, Bryant was accused of sexually assaulting a nineteen year old female at a
Colorado Springs resort. The drama of Bryant's arrest and subsequent trial received massive
media coverage and dominated sports pages. During the 2004 NBA playoffs, reports of Bryant's
legal troubles often overshadowed coverage of Bryant's performances on the court.
6 Craige, supra note 1, at 527.
7 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8 Nat Stem, Unresolved Antithesis of the Limited Purpose Public Figure Doctrine, 33 Hous.
L. REv. 1027,1028 (1996). "Perhaps no element more frequently determines the outcome of defa-
mation suits than the plaintiff's designation as either a public of private figure." Id.
9 Craige, supra note 1, at 547.
10 See id.; Pamela C. Laucella & Barbara Osborne, Libel and College Coaches, 12 J. LEGAL
ASPECTs SPORT 183 (2002); Richard M. Wise, The Athlete as Public Figure in Light of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., or Torts in Sports: The Role of the Courts, 6 COMM. & ENT. L. J. 325 (1984).
l1 See Craige, supra note 1, at 548. Craige notes that Michael Jordan did not file suit for libel
when it was widely reported that his father's death was linked to Jordan's gambling debts.
12 See Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. 1993) (finding a high school football coach to be
a public figure); contra Milkovich v. The News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191(Ohio 1984) (highly
successful high school wrestling coach not a public figure).
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to an increase in libel suits involving high school athletes. 13 Wilson v. Daily
Gazette Co.,14 a recent decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
held that a prominent high school athlete was not a public figure. 15 The sporting
press should take special notice of this decision. Wilson suggests the possibility
that the tabloid freedom the sports media enjoys while reporting on professional
and college athletes does not extend to the high school ranks. If courts begin to
systematically treat high school athletes as private figures, reporters publishing
controversial stories about high school athletes will be forced to tread lightly for
fear of libel suits.
It is crucial for the press to be able to predict with accuracy how courts
will rule on the status of plaintiff athletes.' 6 A lack of clear rules to guide re-
porters may "chill" the press or result in needless litigation.' 7 Similarly, a de-
famed high school athlete cannot properly assess the costs or benefits of a libel
suit if she cannot accurately predict how the court will rule on her status.18 Di-
rection is needed, therefore, to inform the press of its responsibilities when re-
porting on high school athletes, and to guide potential plaintiffs considering
defamation suits. The purpose of this Note is to clarify when a high school ath-
lete will be considered a public figure.
Section II of the Note will provide a brief overview of defamation law,
beginning with its common law roots and ending with the Supreme Court's ar-
ticulation of the public figure doctrine in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Section I
will take a close look at how courts have applied the public figure doctrine post-
Gertz. Section IV will show how courts traditionally apply the Gertz public
figure tests to athletes. Finally, Section V will examine how the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals applied the public figure tests to a high school athlete
in Wilson and will suggest what facts must be shown to prove that a high school
athlete is a public figure.
II. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE
It has been said that an "individual's right to the protection of his own
good name 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of or-
13 See generally Kevin P. Braig, A Game Plan to Conserve the Interscholastic Athletic Envi-
ronment After Lebron James, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 343 (2004).
14 588 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 2003).
15 Id.
16 See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dis-
cussing the importance of a clear test for public figures); Mark D. Walton, The Public Figure
Doctrine: A Reexamination of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. in Light of Lower Federal Court Public
Figure Formulations, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 147 (1995) (a lack of clear guidelines leads to
self-censorship in the media).
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dered liberty."'" 9 Accordingly, protecting individual reputation from defama-
tory speech is a fundamental concept that evolved throughout many generations.
Defamation law may be traced back as far as the time of Alfred the Great.2° In
those days, defamation was remedied by cutting out the offender's tongue.2'
Although undoubtedly effective at deterring defamatory speech, this practice
eventually gave way to a less barbaric approach. The foundation of the modem
tort of defamation was laid in the common law courts of England in the seven-
teenth century.22 Modem defamation law, as it is practiced in this country, is a
unique and oftentimes confusing area of civil law.
A. The Common Law of Defamation
The tort of defamation in its present form is unique in that it consists of
a mix of common law rules, state statutory reforms, and constitutional doc-
trines.23 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a communication as de-
famatory "if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or deal-
ing with him.",2 4 A person is liable for defamation if she, at least, negligently
publishes a false and defamatory statement concerning another.25 At common
law, defamers were held strictly liable for publishing defamatory material re-
gardless of fault.26 Today, Supreme Court decisions based upon constitutional
principles require plaintiffs to prove some level of fault, usually negligence.27
Defamation is really made up of two separate torts, "libel" and "slan-
der., 28 Simply put, libel is the written or printed form of defamation, whereas
slander is the publication of defamatory matter by words or gestures. 29 Origi-
nally, libel was treated as a more serious offense than slander.30 Today, the dis-
19 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).




23 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:6 (1986).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (2000).
25 Id. § 558. The Restatement defines publication as "communication intentionally or by a
negligent act to one other than the person defamed." Id.
26 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 1:7.
27 The Supreme Court has held that, "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (2000).
29 Id.
30 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 1:04. Most Americans were illiterate in the early days of the
Republic. The written word was viewed with an awesome respect and written defamation was
[Vol. 108
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tinction is awkward and often difficult to apply.3' Its only relevance rests in the
fact that the prevailing common law requires plaintiffs to plead and prove "spe-
cial damages" in an action for slander, unless the slander is slander per se.32 A
slander is slander per se if it imputes to another a criminal offense, a loathsome
disease, matters incompatible with her profession, or serious sexual miscon-
duct.
33
A person accused of defamation may avoid liability if she can prove
that the defamatory communication was factually true.34 Other defenses to
defamation include a mix of common law absolute and qualified privileges.35
Absolute privileges are a complete defense to a claim of defamation.36 Consent
of another to the publication of defamatory matter is an example of an absolute
privilege.37 Other absolute privileges apply to publications relating to judicial
matters, legislative proceedings, executive publications, publications between
spouses, and publications required by law. 38 Qualified, or conditional, privi-
leges attach principally to communications published to protect the interests of a
publisher, the interests of a third person, family members, or matters of impor-
tant public interest. 39 These privileges serve as a defense to defamation as long
as they are not abused by the publisher.n° A publisher of defamatory matter
abuses a qualified privilege if she knows the information is false or publishes
41with a reckless disregard as to falsity.
B. The Rise of the Public Figure Doctrine
It is important to understand the common law of defamation because
defamation is still largely a matter of state tort law.42 A line of Supreme Court
cases, however, superimposes First Amendment constitutional doctrines atop
the common law and requires states to hold certain defamation plaintiffs to a
seen as more credible than spoken words. Accordingly, it was thought that libel left a more seri-
ous stain on a person's reputation. Id.
31 Id. Professor Smolla notes that it is particularly troublesome for courts deciding whether
statements made on radio, television, or other electronic media are libel or slander. Some jurisdic-
tions treat oral statements made during broadcasts as libel. Some treat them as slander. Id.
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569-70.
33 Id. § 570.
34 Id. § 581A.
35 Id. § 583-603.
36 Id. § 583-92.
37 Id. § 583.
38 Id. § 584-92.
39 Id. § 594-603.
40 Id. § 599.
41 Id. § 600.
42 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 1:6.
2006]
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higher standard of proof. The genesis of this doctrine is found in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.43 In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that per-
sons who hold public office must prove defamatory statements were published
with "actual malice" to recover for defamation. 44 A false communication is
made with "actual malice," the Court said, when it is published knowingly or
with reckless disregard for whether it is false.45 Holding public officials to this
higher standard of proof was necessary, the Court felt, to safeguard the freedom
of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment and to prevent self-censorship
on matters of public importance.46
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, and its companion case Associated Press
v. Walker,47 extended the rule of New York Times to include public figures as
well as public officials. 48 Freedom of discussion, the Court reasoned, "must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the period. ' 49 The Court
felt, therefore, that publications concerning well-known figures connected to
areas of public interest warranted constitutional protection from the dangers
identified in New York Times.50 The public versus private dichotomy created by
Butts was soon placed aside, however. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,5' the
Court extended the application of the New York Times burden of proof to protect
any defamatory falsehoods related to matters of general or public interest.
52
This holding provided the media with a fantastic level of protection from libel
suits. 53 Rosenbloom proved to be short lived, however.
Three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. ,4 the Court expressly re-
jected the public interest test and announced a return to the rules of New York
43 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44 Id. at 279-80.
45 Id.
46 Id. The Court stated,
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a pub-
lic official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
Id.
47 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
48 Id. at 154.
49 Id. at 147 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
50 Id. at 155.
51 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
52 Id.
53 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 2:9.
54 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
[Vol. 108
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Times and Butts.55 Elmer Gertz, the plaintiff, filed suit for libel in response to a
magazine article portraying him as the architect of a Communist plot to discredit
the Chicago Police.56 Gertz, a Chicago lawyer, had been hired to represent the
family of a slain youth in civil litigation against a Chicago policeman responsi-
ble for the boy's death.57 The defendant was the publisher of American Opin-
ion, a magazine that served as an outlet for the views of the John Birch soci-
ety.58 An article in that magazine covering the criminal trial of the policeman
portrayed Gertz as a Leninist and a criminal.59 These statements and others
about Gertz were false, and the managing editor of American Opinion made no
effort to substantiate the claims or verify their accuracy.6°
Gertz sued the publisher, claiming the defamatory falsehoods injured
his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen.61 In his defense, the publisher asserted
that Gertz was a public official or a public figure and invoked the New York
Times privilege.62 After hearing evidence on the issue, the District Court found
that Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure.6 3 Nevertheless, the
court anticipated the reasoning of Rosenbloom and held that the New York Times
privilege protected the publication because the article addressed an issue of pub-
lic interest.64 The Seventh Circuit agreed on appeal and read the Supreme
Court's intervening opinion in Rosenbloom as requiring the application of the
New York Times standard to "any publication or broadcast about an issue of
significant public interest, without regard to the position, fame, or anonymity of
the person defamed .... ,65
The Supreme Court reversed and, in so doing, revived the public/private
dichotomy of Butts.66 The Court reasoned that the public interest tests of Rosen-
bloom failed to properly accommodate a balance between the need for a free,
55 Id. at 342. Gertz also significantly altered other areas of the common law of defamation.
The other rules announced in Gertz are as follows: (1) Private, as well as public, figures must
base suits for defamation upon a showing of fault; (2) Presumed damages are not permitted absent
a showing of actual malice, and "actual injury" must be proven before damages can be awarded;
(3) punitive damages may not be awarded absent proof of actual malice; and (4) the expression of
opinion is afforded constitutional protection. Id. at 347-50. Numbers (2) and (3) above were
subsequently altered by the Supreme Court's decision in Dunn & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
56 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326.
57 Id. at 325.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 326. The article stated that Gertz's police file "took 'a big, Irish cop to lift."' Id.
60 Id. at 326-27.
61 Id. at 327.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 329.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 330.
66 Id. at 351.
20061
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uninhibited press and the legitimate state interest in redressing wrongful in-
jury.67 A return to the New York Times doctrine was necessary, the Court felt, to
bring these interests back into stasis. 68 Private individuals, the Court said, do
not possess access to the media and thus lack the means to fend off damaging
attacks.69 On the other hand, the Court reasoned that public officials and public
figures have access to effective modes of mass communication and can publicly
correct defamatory misstatements.7 ° More importantly, the Court said, public
officials and public figures necessarily assume the risk of defamatory criticism
by voluntarily choosing to live public lives.7' These two concerns, self-help and
assumption of risk, are central to the Court's justification for applying the actual
malice standard of New York Times to public officials and public figures.72
After finding that Gertz was not a public official, the Court turned its at-
tention to deciding whether he was a public figure.73 Public figures, the Court
stated, "[assume] roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. ''74 Fur-
ther, the Court said the designation of a plaintiff as a public figure may rest on
either of two alternative bases. 75 The Court said,
[iun some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual vol-
untarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public con-
troversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range
of issues.76
Applying this test to Gertz, the Court found that he was not a public fig-
ure for all purposes.77 Gertz had long been active in community affairs; he had
served as an officer of local civic groups and professional organizations, and
had published books and articles on legal subjects.78 But although he had
gained recognition in some circles, the Court held he had not achieved general
67 Id. at 346.
68 Id. at 343.
69 Id. at 344.
70 Id. Gertz did recognize however that "an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the
truth rarely catches up with a lie." Id. at 344 n. 9.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 351-52.
74 Id. at 345.
75 Id. at 351.
76 Id.
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fame or notoriety in the community. 79 The Court noted that none of the pro-
spective jurors called at trial had ever heard of Gertz and there was no evidence
to suggest this was not an atypical response in the community.
8 0
The Court further found that Gertz was not a public figure for the lim-
ited purpose of comment on issues surrounding the policeman's criminal trial.8
Gertz had attended a coroner's inquest into the death of his clients' son, but he
never participated in the prosecution of the policeman responsible.82 His in-
volvement with the case was restricted to the civil litigation and there was no
evidence that he discussed either the criminal prosecution or the civil case with
the press.83 The Court found, therefore, that Gertz neither thrust himself into the
vortex of the public issue surrounding the prosecution, nor did he engage the
public's attention to influence its outcome.84
Ill. APPLYING THE GERTZ PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE
The public figure doctrine calls for the trial judge to decide whether or
not the privilege applies to a particular communication.85 In Gertz, the Supreme
Court eschewed an ad hoc approach to determining public figure status and in-
stead laid down broad rules of general application that would "treat alike vari-
ous cases involving differences as well as similarities., 86 The Court basically
defined two categories of public figures for lower courts to apply: all purpose
public figures and limited purpose public figures.87 A third category, the invol-
untary public figure, is sometimes mentioned by courts, but rarely applied.88 All
defamation plaintiffs, regardless of which category they fall under, must meet








85 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 2:116.
86 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. "Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of the
press and the individual's claim'to compensation for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-
by-case basis ... [b]ut this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable." Id.
87 Id. at 351. The Supreme Court legitimized this interpretation in Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n. 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979). ("We identified [in Gertz] two ways in which a person may
become a public figure for purposes of the First Amendment[.]").
88 See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
89 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
2006]
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A. All Purpose Public Figures
Anyone who achieves general fame or notoriety in their community
may be deemed a public figure for all purposes.90 All purpose public figures are
rare.91 They are usually celebrities whose names are household words. 92 Ac-
tors, entertainers, and political candidates are usually all purpose public fig-
ures.93 Sports figures as well are often labeled with this distinction.94 In Gertz,
the Supreme Court recognized the great influence all purpose public figures
have over the public so it afforded public criticism of these individuals great
protection under the first amendment.95 All purpose public figures are public
figures for all aspects of their lives, and any publication concerning these indi-
viduals must meet the actual malice test to be considered defamatory.
96
A court may or may not require an individual to be nationally well-
known to be considered an all purpose public figure. Gertz did not specifically
require all purpose public figures to be nationally famous.97 This view is echoed
in jurisdictions that have found well-known individuals in small geographic
areas to be all purpose public figures.98 The D.C. Circuit held that nationwide
fame was not required in Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc.99 The
Waldbaum court said that the inquiry should be "whether the individual has
achieved the necessary degree of fame and notoriety where he was defamed i.e.,
90 Id. at 351.
91 See SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 2:22. Professor Smolla notes that the Supreme Court in Gertz
expressed its preference for classifying plaintiffs as limited purpose public figures.
92 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
93 See generally Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997) (Clint East-
wood); Newton v. NBC, Inc., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990) (Wayne Newton); Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (Johnny Carson); Burnett v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 991 (1983) (Carol Burnett); Williams v. Pasma, 656 P.2d 212 (Mont. 1982) (unsuccessful
candidate for United States Senator was public figure); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d
Cir. 1969) (U.S. Senator who became the Republican presidential nominee in 1964 was a public
figure); Nader v. Ralph Toledano and Copley Press, Inc., 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979)(finding Ralph
Nader, a political activist, to be a public figure).
94 See Curtis Publ'n Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135 (1967).
95 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
96 Id. at 352.
97 Id. The Gertz Court simply stated that an all-purpose public figure requires "general fame
or notoriety in the community." Id. (emphasis added).
98 See Williams v. Pasma, 656 P.2d 212 (Mont. 1982); Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner,
372 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1979). But see SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 2.20. Professor Smolla cautions
that the Supreme Court's recent conservatism, as well as philosophies underlying the Court's
recent defamation decisions may indicate an unwillingness on the part of the Supreme Court to
accept a "local" all-purpose public figure.
99 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 108
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where the defamation was published."'l In other words, a plaintiff, although
she is not well-known nationally, may become a public figure if she is well-
known to the publication's audience.' O'
Another issue sometimes addressed by courts is whether an all-purpose
public figure can shed the status over time. Hypothetically, an all purpose pub-
lic figure may wish to escape celebrity and seek a life of anonymity. Should
this person still be treated as a public figure? The Supreme Court has said very
little about this possibility. In Rosenblatt v. Baer,'0 2 the Court suggested in dicta
that a public official may be so far removed from a former position of authority
that comment on the person may no longer maintain the interest required to sus-
tain the actual malice protection. 103 Lower courts thus far have been reluctant,
however, to follow this advice and allow the passage of time to affect public
figure status.
1'4
B. Limited Purpose Public Figures
Publications concerning limited purpose public figures receive a lesser
degree of protection than publications concerning all purpose public figures.
Limited purpose public figures are public figures only with respect to a particu-
lar public controversy. 105 Criticism of limited purpose public figures, therefore,
is protected only to the extent that it references the controversy giving rise to
public figure status.1°6 In Gertz, the Court stated, "[i]t is preferable to reduce the
public figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and
extent of an individual's participation in the particular public controversy giving
100 Id. at 1295. Compare Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (holding plaintiff was
not an all-purpose public figure because she did not assume any role of especial prominence out-
side of Palm Beach Society).
101 Waldbaum, 627 F.2d 1287. This notion of "audience" can present problems however. For
example, assume a defamatory statement was disseminated to a wide audience, but the plaintiff is
well-known only to a small community. Should the plaintiff be treated as a private figure since
she is unknown to the majority of the publication's audience? Or should she be treated as a public
figure for the segment of the audience to which she is well known and as a private individual for
the rest? The court in Waldbaum seems to prefer the later. Id.
102 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
103 Id. at 87 n. 14.
104 See generally Street v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454
U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981) (alleged rape victim remained a public figure 40
years after the incident for purposes of comment concerning the allegations); Brewer v. Memphis
Publ'ns Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980) (former girlfriend of Elvis Presley remained a public
figure despite her efforts to seek anonymity); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971)
(former professional basketball player remained public figure nine years after retirement).
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rise to the defamation."' 0 7 Courts, for the most part, follow this advice and pre-
fer to classify plaintiffs as limited purpose public figures when possible. 10 8
1. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Limited Purpose Public
Figure Doctrine.
Supreme Court decisions following Gertz significantly narrowed the
limited purpose public figure doctrine. The first of those decisions was Time,
Inc. v. Firestone.°9 Firestone arose when news of a divorce proceeding be-
tween Russell Firestone, heir to the Firestone tire fortune, and Mary Alice Fire-
stone was printed in the "Milestones" section of Time magazine. 10 Included in
a short blurb about the divorce trial was a statement that testimony at the pro-
ceedings revealed extramarital affairs that would "make Dr. Freud's hair
curl.""' Mary Alice denounced the testimony as false and sued Time for li-
bel. 2 Time argued that Mary Alice was a public figure and had to prove actual
malice."13
The Firestone divorce, as characterized by the Florida Supreme Court,
was a "cause celebre."' 1 4 Time argued the divorce was therefore a public con-
troversy, and Mary Alice's involvement in the trial rendered her a limited pur-
pose public figure."15 The Supreme Court disagreed and refused to classify
Mary Alice as a limited purpose public figure.16
The Court found that Mary Alice did not voluntarily assume a position
of especial prominence in the resolution of a public question "'7 Mary Alice
Firestone was compelled by the state to enter into the divorce proceedings as a
condition to receiving a divorce'18 As such, she did not voluntarily thrust her-
self into any discussion as to the propriety of her marriage."19 Moreover, the
Court refused to consider tabloid affairs such as the "marital difficulties of ex-
tremely wealthy individuals" public controversies. 20 To do so, the Court ar-
107 Id. at 352.
108 See supra note 23 at § 2:15.
109 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
110 Id. at 452.
"II Id. Testimony on behalf of Russell Firestone alleged at trial that Mary Alice was "guilty of
bounding from one bed partner to another with the erotic zest of a satyr." Id. at 450.
112 Id. at 482.
113 Id. at 452-53.
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gued, would reinstate the public interest approach of Rosenbloom.,2' The Court
opined that a better analysis for determining the extent of constitutional protec-
tion afforded defamatory falsehoods is to focus on the self-help and assumption
of risk.concerns of Gertz instead of broad, subject-matter classifications.
22
Three years later, the Court dealt with limited purpose public figures
and public controversies again in Hutchinson v. Proxmire.123 Hutchinson arose
from a dispute between Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist, and William
Proxmire, a United States Senator, over what Proxmire referred to as his
"Golden Fleece" award for government spending. 124 The "Golden Fleece" was
an invention of Proxmire's to draw attention to frivolous government spend-
ing. 1 25 Hutchinson sued for libel after Proxmire delivered a speech to Congress
presenting the award to federal agencies funding Hutchinson's research. 126 Hut-
chinson was observing chewing behavior in certain animals in order to study the
effects of stress.1
27
The District Court concluded Hutchinson was a public figure for the
limited purpose of comment on his receipt of federal funds for research projects
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.128 The Supreme Court disagreed and held
that Hutchinson was not a limited purpose public figure. 129 The Court held that
Hutchinson did not voluntarily expose his work to the public, so he assumed no
risk that his receipt of federal grants would invite public criticism and com-
ment.1 30 The Court considered the fact that Hutchinson was a published author
in its assumption of risk analysis, but found that his works reached only a lim-
ited audience within the scientific community.' 3' The Court also found that
Hutchinson's media response to the "Golden Fleece" award was insufficient
evidence that he possessed continuing media access sufficient to rebut Prox-
mire's claims. 32
121 Id.
122 Id. at 456.
123 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
124 Id. at 114.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 119. Proxmire was unsure if he delivered the speech on the Senate floor, or merely
inserted the speech into the Congressional record. Consequently, the majority of the Court's
opinion in Hutchinson dealt with the issue of whether an undelivered speech inserted into the
Congressional record is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. Id.
127 Id. at 115.
128 Id. at 120-22.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 135.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 136.
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Further, the Court noted that "Hutchinson did not thrust himself into a
public controversy" because no public controversy existed over the funding of
Hutchinson's research at the time of the alleged libel. 33 The Court found that
all of the controversy over the matter was created by the defamatory statement
itself.'34 It held, therefore, that Proxmire could not create his own defense by
arguing that his treatment of Hutchinson turned him into a public figure.
135
Lastly, the Court rejected the notion that a general controversy surrounding pub-
lic grants warranted a finding that Hutchinson was a limited purpose public fig-
ure.' 36 Broad, subject-matter classifications, the Court warned, were too much
like the Rosenbloom public interest test and resulted in an improper balancing of
the competing interests underlying defamation law.'
37
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 38 a case decided on the same
day as Hutchinson, found the plaintiff s involuntary and minor involvement in a
controversy crucial to its finding that the plaintiff was not a limited purpose
public figure. 139 A grand jury investigation into Soviet espionage in the United
States was at the center of the conflict in Wolston.140 Ilya Wolston, the plaintiff,
became involved in the proceedings after his aunt and uncle were arrested on,
and later pled guilty to, charges of espionage.14 ' The media took a brief interest
in Wolston when he failed to respond to a subpoena after unsuccessfully arguing
to authorities that a mental condition prevented him from traveling from his
home in the District of Colombia to New York where the grand jury was sit-
ting.' 42 Wolston's later offer to testify was refused, and thereafter he pled guilty
to contempt and received a suspended sentence.1
43
Wolston's claim for libel arose when a book published by the defendant
chronicling Soviet spy activities in the United States listed him as a spy.' 44 A
passage in the book stated that Wolston was among Soviet agents identified as
133 Id. at 135.
134 Id. at 127.
135 Id. at 135. ("Clearly, those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create
their own defense by making the claimant a public figure."). Commentators refer to this as the
"bootstrap" problem. See SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 2:10. Professor Smolla notes that lower
courts responding to this language adhere to a rule that the public controversy must pre-exist the
speech giving rise to the defamation suit. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d
1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Wilson v. The Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197, 206 (W. Va.
2003).
136 Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135.
137 Id.
138 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 161.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 162.
143 Id. at 162-63.
144 Id. at 159.
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living in the United States and that he was convicted of contempt charges fol-
lowing his indictment for espionage. 145 These accusations were false; although
he had been subpoenaed, Wolston was never actually indicted as a spy.1
46
Reader's Digest argued that Wolston's involvement in the spy trial ren-
dered him a limited purpose public figure for purposes of any commentary on
soviet espionage in the 1940's and 1950's. 147 The Supreme Court disagreed and
declined to extend the New York Times privilege to the publication. 48 First, the
Court found that Wolston had not thrust himself into the forefront of a public
controversy because he was "dragged unwillingly" by the Government into the
spy proceedings. 49 Moreover, that Wolston voluntarily chose not to respond to
a grand jury subpoena during the proceedings did not convince the Court that he
had voluntarily exposed himself to public comment even though media attention
and publicity resulted. 150 The Court said "the simple fact that these events at-
tracted media attention . . . is not conclusive of the public-figure issue. A pri-
vate individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by be-
coming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention."'
5'1
Rather, the Court felt the focus should rest on the nature and extent of an indi-
vidual's participation in the particular public controversy. 52 Wolston had not
discussed the matter with the press and played only a tangential role in the spy
proceedings. 153 Therefore, the Court found his actions did not thrust him into
the vortex of a public controversy.' 54 The Court also rejected the notion that any
person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public figure
for the purposes of comment addressing that person's conviction.1
55
2. Lower Court Treatment of the Limited Purpose Public Figure
Doctrine
Critics argue that Gertz and its progeny failed to establish any clear, ob-
jective guidelines for lower courts to follow when applying the limited purpose
145 Id.
146 Id. at 160.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 166.
149 Id.
15o Id. at 167.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 166.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 168.
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public figure test. 156 At least one judge feels that applying the doctrine is like
"trying to nail a jellyfish to a wall."'157 This lack of clarity, some argue, has led
jurisdictions to develop inconsistent limited purpose public figure tests. 58 Lim-
ited purpose public figure tests in different jurisdictions may differ slightly from
one another, but they all examine essentially the same factors. 59 For the most
part, the tests consider whether the plaintiff was involved in a public contro-
versy, whether the defamatory statement is related to the plaintiffs involvement
in that particular controversy, and whether the plaintiff voluntarily or intention-
ally thrust herself to the forefront of the controversy.]60
Individual factors aside from the above considerations that lower courts
have found to be influential are: the extent of the plaintiffs involvement in the
controversy, the degree of public divisiveness concerning the controversy,
whether the plaintiff attempted to influence resolution of the controversy,
whether the controversy preexisted the defamatory speech, whether non-
participants are affected by the controversy, whether the plaintiff is in a position
to influence the controversy, whether the plaintiff had access to the media,
whether the plaintiff's public figure status continued to exist at the time of the
defamation, and whether the defamatory speech was geographically or institu-
tionally limited to the area in which the plaintiff had achieved public figure
status.16' Not all of these factors will be relevant in every case. Jurisdictions
may weigh some factors differently and reach different results in cases with
similar fact patterns. 62 The important thing to remember is that a myriad of
factors may be relevant to a defamation plaintiff's limited purpose public figure
status. Waldbaum, for instance, advocates an objective approach that calls for
courts to look through the eyes of a reasonable person at the facts taken as a
whole.'
63
156 Mark D. Walton, The Public Figure Doctrine: A Reexamination of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. in Light of Lower Federal Court Public Figure Formulations, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 155
(1995).
157 Rosanova v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 411 F. Supp 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), affd, 580 F.2d 859
(1978).
158 See Walton, supra note 156 at 159.
159 Id. at 165.
160 Id.
161 See SMOLLA, supra note 23 at § 2:09.
162 See Walton, supra note 156 at 167. Walton notes that a California appellate court held that
organized crime is not a public controversy in Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 165 Cal. Rptr.
347, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); but see Rosanova v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th
Cir. 1978) (finding that organized crime is a public controversy).
163 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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C. Involuntary Public Figures
Some courts have interpreted a line from Gertz as creating a third cate-
gory of public figure, the involuntary public figure. 64 In Gertz, the Court said
"[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to be a public figure through
no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare."'165  Supreme Court decisions after Gertz
failed to mention involuntary public figures and lower courts rarely apply the
distinction, leading some commentators to doubt the continued existence of the
category. 166 Involuntary public figures seem to be resurfacing, however. In
Wells v. Liddy,167 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defamation
plaintiff is an involuntary public figure when she is a central figure in a signifi-
cant public controversy, the defamatory statement arose from discourse sur-
rounding the controversy, and the plaintiff acted, or failed to act in a way in
which a reasonable person would understand that publicity would inhere.
168
IV. THE GERTz PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE AND ATHLETES
Athletes are, for all intents and purposes, entertainers like actors and
musicians and, as such, are highly exposed to the public and the media. Media
coverage of athletes and athletics is pervasive. Cable television networks dedi-
cated to around-the-clock sports coverage provide up-to-the-minute updates on
the latest happenings in the world of professional and amateur sports. The suc-
cess of these networks reflects both the intense public demand for sports report-
ing and the high level of celebrity athletes are capable of achieving. It is not
surprising, therefore, that athletes often find themselves as subjects of a libel
suit and scrutinized under the Gertz public figure analysis.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,169 the genesis of the public figure doc-
trine, is the only Supreme Court decision to apply the public figure test to a
sports figure. Butts stemmed from controversy surrounding a 1962 football
game between the Universities of Georgia and Alabama. 170 After Georgia re-
ceived a "'frightful physical beating ' " 7' at the hands of the Crimson Tide, an
article published in the Saturday Evening Post accused Wally Butts, then the
164 See, e.g., Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
165 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1973).
166 See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 538 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating "[s]o rarely have courts de-
termined that an individual was an involuntary public figure that commentators have questioned
the continuing existence of that category.").
167 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
168 Id. at 539-40.
169 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
170 Id. at 135.
171 Id. at 136.
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athletic director at Georgia, of "fixing" the game. 172 The article alleged that
Butts supplied legendary Alabama football coach Paul "Bear" Bryant with
"plays, defensive patterns, [and] all the significant secrets Georgia's football
team possessed. ' 173 An insurance salesman, George Burnette, claimed to have
accidentally overheard the espionage while listening to a phone conversation
between Butts and Bryant. 174 Butts sued for libel after resigning his position at
Georgia. 175 The Court, ruling on the case, extended the New York Times privi-
lege to public figures and held that Butts was a public figure by virtue of his
former position and notoriety as a former coach of the Bulldogs and an athletic
director at UGA.176 After Butts, courts began finding athletes to be public fig-
ures with regularity. 1
77
A. Professional Athletes
-Professional athletes are almost always found to be public figures. 178 A
case decided after Butts, but before Gertz, saw public figures as "those who,
though not public officials, are 'involved in issues in which the public has a
justified and important interest' .. . and include... athletes."'' 79 In Time Inc. v.
Johnston, 80 another pre-Gertz decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
found Neil Johnston, a former professional basketball player with the Philadel-
phia Warriors, to be a public figure.' 81 The court said, "[Johnston] had offered
his services to the public as a paid performer and had thereby invited comments
on his performance as such. In a sense, he assumed the risk of publicity, good
or bad, as the case might be, so far as it concerned his public performance."'
82
Post-Gertz cases continue to find professional athletes to be public fig-
ures. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club183 is recognized by commenta-
172 Id. at 135-36.
173 Id. at 136.
174 Id.
175 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 137 (1967).
176 Id. at 154.
177 See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine and Broad., Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1968)
(finding Orlando Cepeda, a professional baseball player, to be a public figure); Time Inc. v.
Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding Neil Johnston, a professional basketball
player with the Philadelphia Warriors, to be a public figure).
178 See supra note 10. Professor Wise cautions against this assumption, however. He notes
that a reserve place kicker for a professional football team may play for several years without
making a mark nationally or locally. Wise, supra note 10, at 354 n. 230.
179 Cepeda, 392 F.2d at 419 (emphasis added).
180 448 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1971).
'81 Id.
182 id.
183 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
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tors as the most important case brought by an athlete since Butts.' 84 Donald
Chuy was a starting offensive lineman for the Philadelphia Eagles. 85 His suit
for defamation against the Eagles arose from reports of a severe injury he re-
ceived while executing a downfield block in a game against the New York Gi-
ants.1 86 When the Eagles team physician was interviewed by a reporter from the
Philadelphia Bulletin about Chuy's injuries, he stated that Chuy was suffering
from a rare fatal blood disease and would never play football again.1 87 Chuy
became panicked after reading the article and suffered severe emotional dis-
tress.'88 Chuy sued for defamation after it became apparent to him that he was
not suffering from the alleged disease.'
89
At trial, the jury resolved Chuy's defamation claim in favor of the Ea-
gles.190 Chuy argued that the court applied the wrong standard of proof and
motioned for a new trial.191 Ruling upon Chuy's motion, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania said that "[flew would deny
that Donald Chuy was a public figure in the ordinary sense of the word, for...
he was a prominent professional athlete, frequently the subject of sports
news."'192 Explaining its holding further, the district court clarified why Chuy's
situation as a professional athlete was different from that of the celebrity plain-
tiff's in Firestone and why professional sports must be considered amongst the
"affairs of society" that warrant special protection for the press. 93 The court
said,
[w]here a person has, however, chosen to engage in a profession
which draws him regularly into regional and national view and
leads to 'fame and notoriety in the community,' even if he has
no ideological thesis to promulgate, he invites general public
discussion. We obviously cannot say that the public's interest
in professional football is important to the commonwealth or to
the operation of a democratic society in the same sense as are
political and ideological matters. However, the fabric of our
society is rich and variegated. As is demonstrated by the Niel-
184 Wise, supra note 10, at 344.
185 Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 256 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 595 F.2d
1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
186 Id. at 257.
187 Id.
188 See id.
189 Id. at 256-57. Included amongst Chuy's defamation claim were claims for breach of con-
tract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 258.
192 Id. at 266.
193 Id. at 267.
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sen ratings, the American public is fascinated by professional
sports. In view of that fact we must affirm the proposition that
interest in professional football must be deemed an important
incident among many incidents, of a society founded upon a
high regard for free expression.
94
Americans' interest in professional sports, the district court reasoned, justifies
protecting publications about athletes.1 95 The court explained,
[i]f society chooses to direct massive public attention to a par-
ticular sphere of activity, those who enter that sphere inviting
such attention must overcome the Times standard. Society's in-
terest inspires comment in the press and elsewhere. The greater
the interest, the greater is the public's self-generating need for
the facts. This is especially so in this case where the subject
matter pertained to Donald Chuy's ability to continue playing
professional football, a matter in which the sports loving public
had a not insignificant interest.1
96
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rul-
ing. 197 Chuy, the court said, was a public figure at least with respect to his abil-
ity to play football. 9 8 The court stated, "[p]rofessional athletes, at least as to
their playing careers, generally assume a position of public prominence. Their
contractual disputes, as well as their athletic accomplishments, command the
attention of sports fans."' 199 Accordingly, the court applied the New York Times
burden of proof to Chuy's case because the statements in the Bulletin article
addressed a matter that occurred on the playing field in front of thousands of
interested spectators and dealt directly with Chuy's ability to continue playing
professional football.200 The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's
take on Firestone.20 1 Don Chuy was a public figure, the court reasoned, partly
because intrigue surrounding professional athletics commands a wider audience




197 Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
198 Id. at 1280.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1280 n. 21.
202 Id. ("Although the marital troubles of the wealthy do not make them public figures, a pro-
fessional athlete's contractual troubles relating to his playing performance commands the attention
of a more sustained and wider public audience.")
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Since Chuy, athletes competing professionally in sports such as football,
boxing, golf, and horse racing have been found to be public figures. 2 3 In Bell v.
the Associated Press,2°4 Theo Bell, a wide receiver for the Tampa Bay Bucca-
neers whose notorious career includes a litany of misdeeds, was found to be a
limited purpose public figure.20 5 The court held, "with respect to professional
athletes ... charges of criminal misconduct are a subject of public controversy
and those who are the subject of such charges are public figures for that limited
purpose. ' 2° In Gomez v. Murdoch,207 a flat track jockey was found to be a pub-
lic figure.2°8 The Gomez court said, "there is no way in the world that a man
could decide to become a jockey, put the silks on and ride before hundreds of
thousands of people as he [plaintiff] has and not call himself a public figure. ' 2°
In Wilsey v. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., 210 a harness track driver was found
to be a public figure, in part, because harness racing attracted significant public
interest throughout New York and the plaintiff was generally recognized by the
public as an expert in the sport. 1 In Brooks v. Paige,212 a star professional soc-
cer player for the Denver Avalanche, a team in the now-defunct Major Indoor
Soccer League, was found to be a public figure. A Colorado district court ruled
that Adrian Brooks, the plaintiff, was a public figure because he was a well-
known sports figure in the Denver area and statements concerning him were a
matter of public concern.213 The court held,
203 See Brewer v. Memphis Publ'g Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247-48 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding
John Brewer, a former football player for Ole Miss and the Cleveland Browns to be a public fig-
ure); Rood v. Finney, 418 So. 2d 1, 2 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (finding Floyd Rood, professional
golfer and humanitarian, to be a public figure); Gomez v. Murdoch, 475 A.2d 622, 624 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (professional jockey found to be a public figure); Wilsey v. Saratoga
Harness Racing, Inc., 528 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (N.Y. 1988) (finding a professional harness driver to
be a public figure); Brooks v. Paige, 15 Media L. Rep. 2353 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 773 P.2d
1098 (Colo. 1988) (finding Adrian Brooks, a professional soccer player, to be a public figure);
Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding Buster Doug-
las, a professional boxer, to be a public figure).
204 584 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1984).
205 Id. at 131. Bell was arrested for trespassing, disorderly conduct, drunk driving, and sexual
misconduct during his tenure as a college and professional athlete, and over 100 newspaper arti-
cles had been printed about his escapades at the time of his suit against the Associated Press. Id.
A song had even been written about him: "It's Oilcan Harry, that's my name, I drank that oil and
I smoke cocaine." Id. at note 8.
206 Id. at 132.
207 475 A.2d 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
208 Id. at 624.
209 Id. (quoting trial court).
210 528 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1988).
211 Id. at 690.
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[Iln a sportsminded town such as Colorado [sic.], contract is-
sues concerning star-players in fact become matters of public
concern... matters concerning Mr. Brooks, his contract, his re-
lations with the team, the fact that the team was going to be in
the playoffs and then, did play in the playoffs became a matter
of general discussion and comment among people generally and
in the media.214
The court did not specify whether this made Brooks a limited purpose or all
purpose public figure.215
B. College Athletes
Chuy and the cases above dealt exclusively with professional athletes,
persons who voluntarily chose to enter a profession that invites public attention
and comment. Collegiate athletes, at times, also compete in sports that draw
attention from the public and the media, but not for pay. This begs the question
of how a plaintiff athlete's amateur status should affect a court's public figure
analysis. The fact that a plaintiff was not paid to play college football did not
affect the court's analysis in the case of Holt v. Cox Enterprises.
2 16
The Holt court found Darwin Holt, a former college football player for
the University of Alabama, to be a public figure at least as it related to publica-
tions addressing his athletic performance.217 Holt's claim for libel arose from a
hit he placed upon Chick Graning in a football game between Alabama and
Georgia Tech.218 Holt, the defensive signal caller for the Crimson Tide, struck
Graning in the face with his elbow late in the fourth quarter of the game.
219
Graning suffered a broken jaw, broken nose, a concussion, and lost several
teeth.22 ° Controversy ensued, and newspaper articles written after the game
described the hit as an illegal play.22' Georgia Tech ended its series of games
with Alabama sometime after the affair, and it was widely speculated that the
"Holt-Graning incident" was the cause of Tech's decision. 222 Eighteen years
later, Tech and Alabama resumed their rivalry, rekindling interest in that
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 590 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
217 Id. at 412. (citations omitted).
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game. 3 Articles describing the incident appeared in the Atlanta Journal and
Constitution and contained defamatory comments about Holt's character.224
Holt, a former High School All-American, was a well-known player and
an award-winning star on the Alabama team, but the court held he was not an all
purpose public figure. 25 Instead, the court found Holt was a limited purpose
public figure, not by virtue of the Holt-Graining incident, but because he volun-
tarily engaged in the sport of college football.226 Citing Chuy, among others, the
court stated,
As a member of the Alabama football team, Holt voluntarily
played that sport before thousands of persons - spectators and
sportswriters alike - and he necessarily assumed the risk that
these persons would comment on the manner in which he per-
formed. The defamatory comments in the articles relate solely
to Holt's play on the field and are thus within the limited range
of issues upon which Holt invited comment. Holt, like other
sports figures who have sought redress through defamation ac-
tions must be considered a public figure, whose actions on the
field sportswriters may criticize within the protective "breathing
227space" required by the First Amendment.
That Holt was not paid to play football was deemed irrelevant.228 The court felt
that Holt's amateur status did not change the fact he voluntarily engaged in a
highly publicized event knowing that the public would comment on his play.2 9
V. WHEN IS A HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETE A PUBLIC FIGURE?
As the cases above demonstrate, an athlete who competes in major
sporting events has basically no shot at convincing a court she is a private indi-
vidual. Litigants and the media should not presume, however, that the public
figure privilege automatically applies to all publications addressing athletes.
The public or private status of a defamation plaintiff is a factual inquiry that
depends heavily upon the individual circumstances of each case. It is entirely
possible to hypothesize an athlete courts will say is not a public figure. 230 So
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 411-12.
226 Id. at 412.
227 Id. (citations omitted).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See supra note 174.
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although the sports page is well protected by the public figure doctrine, it is not
an impregnable fortress.
Stories about high school athletes may be a chink in the armor. High
school athletes, like the plaintiffs in the cases above, compete in spectator sports
that invite attention and comment. It is unclear, however, whether the status of
"high school athlete" will warrant holdings similar to the cases above. The
cases in the previous section are telling indicators of how a court is likely to
treat an athlete, but none of those plaintiffs were in high school. Courts have
applied the doctrine to high school coaches, but there is very little case law deal-
ing with high school athletes.231 Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co.,232 a recent deci-
sion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, is the only published opin-
ion to thoroughly discuss applying the public figure test to a high school ath-
lete.233 As such, Wilson should be viewed as the current authority on the subject
matter. This section will analyze Wilson and suggest when a court is likely to
find that a high school athlete is a public figure.
A. The Current Authority: Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co.
The controversy in Wilson stems from an incident following the conclu-
sion of the 1999 West Virginia statewide championship high school basketball
game between Weir and East Bank High Schools.2 34 It was rumored after the
game that Quincy Wilson, a seventeen year old student at Weir and a participant
in the game, exposed himself to the East Bank fans during a frenzied player
celebration sparked by Weir's last-second victory.235 Accounts of the alleged
exposure circulated throughout the crowd after the game, and East Bank's prin-
ciple reported the incident to police.236 Articles appearing in the Charleston
Gazette repeated the allegations, and an editorial in that paper cited the incident
as part of a growing trend of inappropriate behavior among athletes.237 Wilson
sued the Gazette for defamation following the publication of the articles.2 38
Wilson was arguably West Virginia's best-known high school athlete at
the time the articles were published. He was a star on Weir's football and bas-
ketball teams, lead each of those teams to state championships, was the co-
winner of the Kennedy award given to the state's top high school football
231 See Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. 1993) (finding a high school football coach to be
a public figure); contra Milkovich v. The News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (highly successful high
school wrestling coach not a public figure).
232 588 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 2003).
233 See Pendelton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 1998) (briefly discussing plain-
tiffs notoriety as a former high school sports star in deciding plaintiff was not a public figure).
234 588 S.E.2d at 200.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 201, n.4.
237 Id. at 200-01.
238 Id. at 202.
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player, received press coverage of his signing a letter of intent to accept a schol-
arship to play football at West Virginia University, had his athletic accomplish-
ments listed in a biography on that university's web-site, and was the son of a
former professional football player.239 Based on this evidence, the trial court
concluded that Wilson was a public figure and granted summary judgment for
the defendant after it found that he had failed to allege the articles were pub-
lished with actual malice.24° The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals re-
versed despite Wilson's notoriety and held that he was not a public figure.241
In a 3-2 decision, the court held that Wilson did not fit into any of the
three public figure categories.242 The court found first that Wilson did not pos-
sess the sort of general fame or notoriety required to be an all-purpose public
243figure. A reputation as a quality high school athlete, the court said, did not
"satisfy the high bar outlined by Gertz" and evidenced only a "limited circle of
notoriety. ' 244 Next, the court held that Wilson was not a limited purpose public
figure because he had not voluntarily injected himself into a public contro-
versy.245 After reviewing the articles in question, the court determined that the
present theme of the publications was "sportsmanship," and that no public con-
troversy regarding sportsmanship existed prior to the publication. 246 Moreover,
the court refused to "carve out an exception" to the limited purpose public figure
category and consider Wilson a pubic figure for the limited purpose of comment
on his role as a high school athlete.247 Criticizing Holt as convoluted dicta, the
court declined to place participation in amateur athletics within the public con-
troversy requirement of Gertz. 48 Finally, the court held that Wilson was not an
involuntary public figure because he had not become a central figure in a sig-
nificant public controversy that existed prior to the publication of the alleged
defamation. 249
239 Id. at 205.
240 Id. at 202.
241 Id. at 210.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 205.
244 Id. at 206.
245 Id. at 208.
246 Id. at 209.
247 See id. at 207-08.
248 Id. at 206. "The central requirement imposed by Gertz for labeling a person a limited pur-
pose public figure is that there must be 'a particular controversy.' The mere fact of playing on a
high school football team, or little league baseball team, or a college golf team, is not in and of
itself a controversy." /d.
249 Id. at 208-09.
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B. When is a High School Athlete a Public Figure?
In all likelihood, most courts will be reluctant to label high school ath-
letes public figures. High school athletes are not your typical defamation plain-
tiffs; they are teenagers. Judges will likely consider this fact relevant. A dis-
senting justice in Wilson remarked, "[a]s undesireable [sic.] as I believe it is to
make young high school students public figures, I believe that, in fact, is what
our society has done., 250 It is probably safe to assume that most judges feel the
same way and will err on the side of protecting a teenager's reputation from
harm. A libel defendant will have to be very convincing, therefore, if she hopes
to apply the public figure privilege to a publication about a high school athlete.
This is not to say a court will never find a high school athlete to be a
public figure. Wilson was decided as a close case, 3-2. It is not too much of a
stretch to presume that a different court presented with the same facts may have
reached an opposite conclusion. So libel defendants should not give up hope for
a public figure ruling simply because the plaintiff is a teenage athlete. The fol-
lowing subsections suggest when a court will apply the public figure doctrine to
a high school athlete.
1. Meeting the Twin Concerns: Assumption of Risk and Access
to the Media
It must be shown that a high school athlete meets the twin concerns of
Gertz before she can be considered a public figure. Chuy and the cases in the
preceding section stand for the proposition that a professional or college athlete
voluntarily assumes a position of public prominence inviting attention and
comment the moment he or she sets foot on the field of play. In Gonez, the flat
track jockey case, the court relied on the fact that the plaintiff voluntarily com-
peted in front of hundreds of thousands of people.251 Similarly, the Holt court
noted that the plaintiff chose to participate in a sport before thousands of specta-
tors and sportswriters, and naturally assumed the risk of defamatory com-
ment. 2  This begs the question: does a high school athlete automatically as-
sume the risk of defamatory comment by voluntarily engaging in a spectator
sport?
Yes, if there are facts sufficient to show a high level of public interest in
the athlete's particular sport. The Supreme Court in Wolston said that a plain-
tiff's involvement in an event that attracts significant public interest is not itself
conclusive of the public figure question, 53 but it should go towards proving
assumption of risk. The Chuy court found the "massive public attention" paid to
250 Id. at 210 (McGraw, J. dissenting).
251 Gomez v. Murdoch, 475 A.2d 622, 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
252 Holt v. Cox Enter., 590 F. Supp 408,412 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
253 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
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professional football highly relevant to its decision that Don Chuy was a public
figure.2 4 Public interest in high school sports rarely equals the level of attention
paid to professional football, but high school sports are very popular in some
areas of the country. The Wilson court presumably felt the level of public inter-
est in high school football in West Virginia did not justify labeling the sport's
most prominent athlete a public figure. It is not inconceivable to assume, how-
ever, that in some jurisdictions such a showing may be made. For instance, a
high level of public interest may easily be proven in states such as Texas where
high school football is king. The same may be true for high school basketball in
Indiana or high school ice hockey in Minnesota. Where there is evidence that
the public directs significant attention to a particular high school sport, athletes
competing in that sport must assume the risk of public comment.
Several factors within a community may evidence a high level of public
interest in a particular high school sport. For instance, a judge may consider
attendance numbers at high school athletic events as telling indicators of public
interest. The success of a local sports team may also show a high level of public
interest. In Brewer v. Rogers,2" a high school football coach in Georgia was
found to be a public figure partly because his team was considered to be an elite
256squad. Pervasive coverage of high school sports in local papers and on local
television stations may also indicate high levels of public interest. Courts may
also take into account the "sportsmindedness" of the local community. In
Brooks, for example, the court was persuaded by the fact that a lot of sports fans
lived in Denver.257
A plaintiff must also possess significant media access to be considered a
public figure. This means that a high school athlete has the means to rebut de-
famatory comments about themselves via the channels of mass communication.
Due to the weight of a teenage student's reputation interests, courts will proba-
bly require clear evidence of continuing media access to satisfy this require-
ment. In most cases, this will be a heavy burden because press coverage of high
school sports is generally limited to few media outlets within a specific geo-
graphic region.
The defendant in Wilson apparently did not convince the court that
Quincy Wilson possessed significant access to the media, although it was estab-
lished that he received press coverage of his signing a letter of intent to play
football at West Virginia University. 258 In Firestone, the Supreme Court sug-
gested in a footnote that holding a few press conferences alone will not trans-
254 Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 595 F.2d
1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
255 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. 1993).
256 Id. at 78.
257 Brooks v. Paige, 15 Media L. Rep. 2353 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1986), aft'd, 773 P.2d 1098 (Colo.
1988).
258 See Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197, 205 (W. Va. 2003).
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form a person into a public figure.259 A high school athlete's ability to com-
mand the attention of a statewide press conference should suffice, however, to
show significant media access. A pervasive amount of interviews, articles, tele-
vision spots, etc. evidence media access. The Chuy court found the fact that
Don Chuy was "frequently the subject of sports news" relevant to its public fig-
ure analysis.260 If a high school athlete is frequently the subject of sports news
within the area in which she was defamed, she probably possesses significant
access to the media.
2. Classifying A High School Athlete Under the Three Public Fig-
ure Categories
The twin concerns of Gertz are the fundamental characteristics of the
public figure. Although central to a public figure finding, they are not necessar-
ily determinative of the issue. A high school athlete must also fit into one of the
three public figure categories - all purpose, limited purpose, or involuntary -
before she can be considered a public figure. Wilson is especially helpful in this
regard because it analyzed a high school athlete's status under all three catego-
ries.
In Wilson, the court was unwilling to label the plaintiff athlete an all
purpose public figure because he was known only to a "limited circle" of high
school football fans in the state of West Virginia.26' Wilson's holding suggests
that success as a high school athlete alone may not lead a court to find the "per-
vasive fame or notoriety" required for an all purpose public figure, even in ju-
risdictions like West Virginia that do not require nationwide fame.2 62 Moreover,
labeling a high school athlete an all purpose public figure opens that individual
up to defamatory criticism related to any subject. It is logical to assume that
courts will be wary of placing such a burden upon a teenager. So where all pur-
pose public figures are rare, high school athlete all purpose public figures are
probably rarer. If courts follow Wilson's lead, a showing that a plaintiffs noto-
riety transcends that of a successful high school athlete will be necessary to sup-
port an all purpose public figure finding.
In deciding whether a plaintiff athlete is an all purpose public figure, the
court in Wilson said trial courts may consider: (1) statistical survey data con-
cerning the athlete's name recognition; (2) evidence of previous media coverage
of the athlete; (3) evidence that others alter or reevaluate their conduct or ideas
259 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454, n.3 (1976).
260 Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 266 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 595 F.2d
1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
261 Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 206.
262 West Virginia only requires "clear evidence of the plaintiff's general fame or notoriety in
the state." Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 216.
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in light of the athlete's actions; and (4) any other relevant evidence.263 Probably
a good example of a high school athlete who possessed pervasive fame and no-
toriety is former high school basketball standout and current NBA superstar
Lebron James. At seventeen, James was billed as the second coming of Michael
Jordan, his games were televised regularly to a nation-wide audience, and he
had already been featured on the cover of Sports Illustrated.264 James achieved
the status of "household name" as a high school athlete and he was viewed as a
celebrity. Had James pressed a libel suit at that time, the court most certainly
would have found him to be an all purpose public figure.
Courts are probably more likely to find that a high school athlete is a
limited purpose public figure as opposed to an all purpose public figure. It is
not difficult to imagine a high school athlete becoming embroiled in some sort
of public controversy involving high school sports. Sports related controversies
are often featured in the media.265 Take the facts of Wilson for instance. The
reports of the plaintiffs alleged misbehavior in that case obviously stirred up a
brief controversy over the appropriateness of player celebrations.2 66 One of the
allegedly defamatory articles reprinted in the opinion spoke of widespread pub-
lic discord over player taunting and trash talking.267 The Wilson court found no
public controversy existed over sportsmanship prior to the incident in ques-
tion.268 But if the plaintiff had embraced the controversy and had attempted to
sway public opinion on the issue by speaking to the media about it, perhaps the
court would have found him to be a limited purpose public figure.
It is unlikely that courts will accept the Holt reasoning and hold that any
plaintiff who voluntarily participates in a sport before spectators and sportswrit-
ers is a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on their role as an ath-
lete.269 The court was unwilling to do so in Wilson and other courts will likely
follow suit.270 Cases like Holt and Chuy seem to apply the public controversy
requirement of the limited purpose public figure test broadly to protect basically
263 Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 216.
264 Grant Wahl, Ahead of His Class; Ohio High School junior LeBron James is so good that
he's already being mentioned as the heir to Air Jordan, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 18, 2002, at
62.
265 For examples of sports-related controversies, see Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F.
Supp. 600, 604 (D.D.C. 1977) (athletic trainer public figure for limited purpose of issues concern-
ing the value of protein supplements); Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ga. App. 1993) (high
school coach implicated in grades scandal was a public figure); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp.
1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (public controversy requirement of Gertz met by investigations by
the NCAA into university's recruiting practices); Silvester v. A.B.C., Cos., Inc., 839 F.2d 1491,
1494 (11 th Cir. 1988) (jai alai fonton owner's central role in industry gambling scandal rendered
him a public figure).
266 Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 200-203.
267 Id. at 201.
268 Id. at 209.
269 See Holt v. Cox Enter., 590 F. Supp. 408,412 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
270 Wilson. 588 S.E.2d at 208.
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any publication addressing an athlete-related subject. Bell, for example, justi-
fied its limited purpose public figure finding partly on the public's ongoing in-
terest in athletes' off-the-field misconduct.
27'
Wilson, by contrast, refused to a find a public controversy over sports-
manship existed prior to the defamatory statements published in the Gazette
although sportsmanship and player celebrations are often a hot topic of discus-
sion in the sports media. 72 This holding is more consistent with the Supreme
Court's suggestion in Firestone to avoid broad subject-matter classifications of
public controversies and will better protect high school athletes from defama-
tory accusations related to sports-related scandals.273 Assuming other courts
will agree with Wilson's approach, a more traditional showing of a pre-existing,
specific, and localized controversy will be necessary to support finding that a
high school athlete is a limited purpose public figure. Of course, any showing
of additional facts listed in the limited purpose public figure sections of this
article will also support branding a high school athlete a limited purpose public
figure.
It will take a very persuasive argument to convince a court that a high
school athlete is an involuntary public figure, even in jurisdictions that accept
the category. The involuntary public figure is the rarest breed of public figure.
Only a handful of courts have ever been willing to label a plaintiff an involun-
tary public figure.274 Courts' general distaste for the category coupled with a
desire to protect the reputation interests of young high school athletes suggests
courts will find in favor of the designation only in unusual instances. Accord-
ingly, a high school athlete will rarely be found to be an involuntary public fig-
ure. In Wilson, the court analyzed the plaintiff athlete's status under the Wells
test and summarily held that the plaintiff did not match the description. 275 That
test assesses whether the plaintiff is a central figure in a significant public con-
troversy, the defamatory statement arose from discourse surrounding the con-
troversy, and the plaintiff acted, or failed to act in a way in which a reasonable
person would understand that publicity would inhere.276
VI. CONCLUSION
As a general rule, high school athletes will not be classified as public
figures with the same frequency as professional and college athletes. Courts
271 Bell v. A.P., 584 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D. D.C. 1984).
272 Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 209. The National Football League's Terrell Owens, for example,
consistently stirs up controversies over his innovative touchdown celebrations. See Don Banks,
The Most Outrageous Terrell Owens Stunts, November 17, 2004,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.coml2004/donbanks/i 1/17/banks.topfive/index.html.
273 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976).
274 Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 208.
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should be wary, however, of summarily treating all high school athletes as pri-
vate individuals. The press must be afforded "breathing space" to report on
high school athletics or self-censorship will occur. Courts will likely prefer to
find high school athletes to be limited-purpose public figures as opposed to all
purpose public figures. To avoid libel suits, the press should limit reports of
materials that are possibly defamatory to specific public controversies when
reporting on high school athletes.
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